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Abstract Large tracts of European rural land, mostly in
the less favored areas (LFA), are devoted to low-inputs and
large scale grazing systems (LSGS) with potential envi-
ronmental and social functions. Although these LSGS may
provide harbor for a good part of European nature values,
their continuity is facing contrasting threats of intensifica-
tion and abandonment. These areas, however, may be
characterized by particular grazing structures and social
dynamics of change that should be unveiled prior to
attempts to devise rural development strategies or to adapt
policy frameworks in general. To wit, stakeholder inter-
actions and legal and institutional processes are described
and analyzed for the cereal-sheep system of Castile-La
Mancha (CLM) in the central Iberian plain. Farmers and
pastoralists still share the use of the land, but their roles and
interests have changed over time, and particularly in the
last 50 years. Arable farming, mainly cereal cropping, has
followed an intensification path, partially tempered by the
environmental constraints of the Castilian plain. Extensive
pastoralism is still a secondary option of land use; in the
main, sheep farmers depend on, and look to, the manage-
ment practices of arable farmers. A mixed cereal and sheep
operation may deliver environmental and economic bene-
fits, but successful implementation of this strategy is only
possible when the system serves the needs of both types of
stakeholders. Paradoxically, the main drivers of change in
the countryside overall are arrayed against this sensible and
traditional agricultural system. We argue that the recent
legal and institutional frameworks do not favor social
cohesion and that policy-support schemes of the European
Union (EU) have been, and continue to be, devised without
taking into account the particular structures and social
dynamic of the farming system.
Keywords European Union policies  Low-input
grazing systems  Landless tenure  Grazing rights 
Policy schemes  Pastoral farming systems  Spain
Abbreviations
ADS Agrupaciones de Defensa Sanitaria (Animal
Health Associations)
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CLM Castile-La Mancha
EU European Union
JCCM Junta de Comunidades de Castilla-La Mancha
LACOPE Landscape Development, Biodiversity and
Co-operative Livestock Systems in Europe
LFA Less favored area
LGC Local Grazing Commission
LSGS Large-scale grazing system
MTR Mid-term review of the CAP
PGC Provincial Grazing Commission
RCMCP Regional Council of Manchego Cheese
Producers
RG Regional Government
TAL Total agricultural land
Introduction
Use of large-scale grazing systems (LSGS) across Europe
has been the main subject of our most recent European
Union (EU) research project (LACOPE 2002). The main
objective of the project was to contribute to the sustainable
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use of LSGS by emphasizing economic and ecological
synergies reached through co-operative management. Data
were generated from seven study areas.
In the study area of south central Spain (CLM), arable
farmers1 and pastoralists share the same land units and
operate them to effect a mixed cereal-sheep agricultural
system. Landowner cultivators cannot maintain their own
flocks of sheep due to the small size of most of their
landholdings. In turn, mainly landless pastoralists rely for
grazing on land rented from farmers. However, the
unbalanced ratio of stakeholders (one pastoralist to about
40–50 farmers) makes co-operation and social consensus
difficult (Caballero 2002b; Caballero 2003). The mixed
agricultural system may deliver economic and environ-
mental assets in the form of higher outputs per unit of land,
suitable habitat quality for target European wildlife and
conservation species such as great bustard (Otis tarda), and
production of indigenous livestock products such as the
Manchego cheese (Oksanen et al. 2006; Caballero et al.
2007). Consequently, proper institutional management is
required to maintain the operation of the system into the
future.
Successful agricultural development interventions,
however, require many different regional and EU policy
schemes that do not always reach their environmental,
economic and social goals (Brouwer and Lowe 2000;
Beaufoy et al. 2003; European Commission 2006; Kleijn
et al. 2006). In this research we hypothesized that agri-
cultural policies may create more divergence than
convergence of interests between cultivators and pastoral-
ists; and that non-participatory, top-down and sectoral
regulations fail to incorporate existing socio-economic
realities on the ground that could otherwise be harnessed to
meet development goals. EU regulations, for example, are
sectoral, but do not take into account the regional differ-
ences in pastoral systems within one particular sector (in
this case, the sheep sector). The paper attempts to under-
stand change with particular emphasis on legal and
institutional processes in the cereal-sheep system of CLM.
Within this context, detailed history of cultivator-pasto-
ralist relationships over time is of paramount importance
because conflicts have arisen historically over shared land.
The paper will illuminate the causes and consequences of
major changes, ending with a discussion of present prob-
lems and proposed solutions. This research can facilitate
further co-ordination and common job within experts of
grassland systems research.
Specifically, the paper will try to clarify the user-struc-
ture of the LSGS concept, and the relationship between
property type and institutional management of pastoral
resources (Fernandez-Gimenez and Le Febre 2006). Rele-
vant ideas on public goods and the theory of groups (Olson
1971; Ostrom et al. 1994) are employed to assist under-
standing of the differences between property-rights and
user-rights in CLM.
Methods and procedures
The regional setting
Castile-La Mancha is the third largest region
(79.2 9 103 km2) within the EU and occupies the southern
Castilian Plain (mean elevation 600 m). The Tajo and
Guadiana Rivers drain the plain, which has a mean regional
rainfall of 450 mm and a Mediterranean continental-type
climate (mean of 30 days with frost per year).
The Total Agricultural Land (TAL) in 1998 was
7.6 9 106 ha, 70% of which is arable land (AL), mostly
(95%) rain-fed arable land (RAL). Winter cereals, annual
legumes, fallow, sunflower, olives and vineyards occupy
42, 6, 20, 8, 9, and 15% of RAL, respectively.
The traditional grazing feed resources included non-
arable land [natural pasture, shrub-steppe vegetation (eri-
ales), and Mediterranean forest], mostly located in the
mountainous fringes of the plain; and agro-pastoral
resources (cereal, legumes, and sunflower stubbles and
fallow) located in the central part, where arable land
dominates. Parcels with olives, vineyards, and irrigation
are by law excluded from grazing use.
The main breed within the regional flock (some
3.5 9 106 breeding ewes) is the Manchega dairy sheep.
Other minor sheep breeds are Seguren˜a, Talaverana,
Castellana and Ojalada. Milk-oriented flocks for the pro-
duction of Manchego cheese are dominant in the plain and
meat-oriented flocks in the foothills and mountainous areas.
Castile-La Mancha is divided into five administrative
provinces (Albacete, Ciudad Real, Cuenca, Guadalajara
and Toledo), 21 counties, and 916 municipalities. The
regional size of landholdings is some 30 ha, but in the
central plain of La Mancha, where the mixed cereal and
sheep agricultural system is dominant, the mean size is
much lower (some 5–10 ha, depending on the county) and
property is frequently split into non-adjacent parcels.
Structure of Spanish grazing systems
Within each municipality, pastoral resources are grouped to
form grazing land allotments (poligonos de pastos), and
frequently the cereal and sheep operations are carried out in
1 In Spanish, there is not a word that is neatly equivalent to ‘‘farmer’’;
and in Spain we make a distinction between the crop farmer
(agricultor) and the livestock farmer (ganadero) with professional
advice and administrative divisions serving both groups.
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these same land units. This structure has functioned to
overcome the constraint of small parcels in maintaining
flocks of adequate size.
The legal framework which regulates grazing manage-
ment distinguishes three types of land units. Grazing land
rented to landless pastoralists (poligonos parcelarios)
occupy some 50% of TAL. Grazing land of large landhold-
ings, segregated from grazing rights transfers (poligonos
segregados), occupy some 30% of TAL. Finally, cropland
with olives, vineyards, and irrigated parcels take up some
20% of TAL, where grazing is prohibited. This structure of
the grazing system shows characteristics of agro-pastoral
(e.g., it relies chiefly on agricultural residues for feed) and
extensive systems (e.g., small stocking of the sheep opera-
tion in contrast with large and unfenced polı´gonos). The
sheep flocks have to be managed constantly and carefully by
shepherds because parcels with available pastoral resources
and non-grazing parcels are frequently interspersed within
the polı´gonos.
The difference between poligonos parcelarios and pol-
igonos segregados is related to the size of the holdings and
the system of grazing rights. Smallholdings are grouped in
poligonos parcelarios and grazing rights are under the
public domain (i.e., a public good) and a renting regime
(small landowners cannot refuse the access by pastoralists).
The poligonos segregados are large holdings (more than
200–300 ha), outside the renting regime, where the owner
may or may not maintain their own flock. In some cases,
large landowners who do not maintain their own flock may
make arrangements with one pastoralist, and negotiate a
grazing fee. In poligonos parcelarios, however, grazing
fees are regulated for the Regional Government (RG).
Data collection
Within each municipality, a Local Grazing Commission
(LGC) operates. This LGC is committee-like with seven
members, and is composed of three cultivators; three
pastoralists; and one representative of the villages’ council,
who acts as president. They keep agricultural records on
grazing-rights for distribution to pastoralists, manage chan-
ges in grazing land units (polı´gonos), and control payments
to cultivators. Each LGC reports to the corresponding Pro-
vincial Grazing Commission (PGC), which is under the
scope of the RG. The RG keeps records on allocations of EU
and regional subsidies to crop and sheep farmers, but the RG
delegates the responsibility for grazing management to the
LGC.
For the purpose of our study, local grazing records were
requested from the five secretaries of the PGC; they were
specifically requested to provide data on the rate of
implementation of current legal regulations (JCCM 2000).
Trends in the last 50 years were derived from records of
the now-abolished Ca´maras Agrarias and local agriculture
staff for EU projects previous to the demise of the Ca´maras
Agrarias (DIVOR-DEF 2002). Most of the recent data on
grazing structure and land use were derived from the EU-
funded LACOPE project, representing the situation in the
year 2002. This was achieved by surveying and consulting
with a random sample of sheep and crop farmers from the
entire region. Details of sampling tools and procedures are
provided in Caballero et al. (2005).
Sheep farmers were sampled using written standardized
questionnaires. The objective and content of the question-
naires were explained during group discussions with
the local Animal Health Associations (Agrupaciones de
Defensa Sanitaria (ADS)). In the qualitative part of the
questionnaire, the research team asked about the relation-
ship between constraints, and proposals regarding regional
pasture regulations, cultivator-pastoralist relationships, and
agricultural policy support. At the end, 231 valid ques-
tionnaires were received from sheep farmers (a minimum
of six and a maximum of 27 from each of the 21 counties)
out of a population of some-6,000 sheep farmers in the
region. Additionally, 92 pairs (crop and sheep farmers) of
valid questionnaires were received from 73 municipalities
out of a total of 916. Local Cadastre-base maps were
provided by the RG. Over one of these maps (municipality
of Casas de Jua´n Nun˜ez, province of Albacete), the local
agriculture staff of La Higueruela (Albacete), displayed
data on grazing unit distribution and stocking rates corre-
sponding to each polı´gono. Figure 1 was created with help
of ArcGIS 9 software. Historical background of cultivator-
pastoralist relationships was derived from available litera-
ture and from more recent comparative legal research on
Spanish grazing systems (Sa´nchez 2004).
Results
Cultivator-pastoralist relationships over time
The system of grazing rights within the public domain
dates from the Middle Ages. The Mesta system regulates
distribution of pastoral resources between nomadic (tras-
humantes) pastoralists and sedentarian (estantes)
pastoralists, the latter did not move their flocks long dis-
tances. Most conflicts in the history of the Mesta (1273–
1836) have been between pastoralists themselves, related to
access to grazing rights (Ruiz Martı´n and Garcı´a Sanz
1998).
At the beginning, the Mesta was a pastoral organization
of small-scale pastoralists intended to regulate of the
trashumance system. Latter, the Mesta became dominated
by owners of big flocks of the monasteries, the military
brotherhoods, and nobility. At the height of its power, the
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Mesta managed 3–4 million Merino sheep—and some
monasteries (Guadalupe and El Paular) owned some
20,000–30,000 sheep. Between summer and winter pas-
tures they moved the flocks long distances (up to 700 km)
along regulated drove corridors (can˜adas and veredas).
The most affected province in CLM was Ciudad Real,
where some of the most famous winter pastures were
located (Valle de Alcudia), but the entire region was in the
North-South pathway of the trashumance system. Because
the estantes flocks of the region could not successfully
compete with the Mesta flocks for the winter pastures, they
developed complementary strategies for providing forage,
such as sowing cereals (as greens) and annual legumes for
grazing and haymaking.
With the disappearance of the Mesta and most of the
trashumance system, conflicts became more frequent
between cultivators and sedentarian pastoralists. Succes-
sive regulations since the nineteenth century favored one or
the other depending on the political trends (more liberal
governments typically favored cultivators). Some of the
winter pastures utilized by the Mesta flocks fell to the plow
(rompimientos de pastos). More recent regulations on
grazing management dates back from 1938 (Pasture and
Stubble Act, October 7) and its associated regulation
(Decree 1256/1969 of June 6). This legal system upheld the
status of grazing rights under the public domain and
established that those landowners with holdings larger than
200–300 ha may segregate their land from grazing right
Fig. 1 Map of parcels and
poligonos de pastos (sheep
allotments) in the municipality
of Casas de Jua´n Nu´n˜ez
(Albacete, Spain)
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transfers. This provision has been upheld by the recent
Regional Pasture and Stubble Act of CLM: Ley 7/2000,
December 5 (JCCM 2000) under the assumption that large
landowners may maintain a flock of regular size (polı´gonos
segregados) outside the renting regime.
European Union considerations
After Spain joined the EU in 1986, additional policy
schemes were considered. Direct payments still accounted
for more than 80% of total subsidies. In the cereal-sheep
system, direct payments to cultivators (per hectare) and to
pastoralists (per head of sheep, ‘‘headage payment’’) are
awarded separately. Overall, the EU policy framework
contributes more to divergence than the convergence of
interest between the two social groups because is unable to
recognize that both operations are carried out on the same
land units (Caballero 2001a, b). What other options face
the cultivators under EU regulations? The EU Rural
Development Regulations (1257/1999 and 1750/1999) were
transformed into Spanish law through Royal Decree 4/2001,
BOE 13 January (M8 de Agricultura 2001). Amongst other
measures, it provides for nine possible agri-environmental
actions for cultivators (e.g., integrated pest management,
organic agriculture, extensification or low intensity culti-
vation, water management, and erosion control). These
schemes are derivation of the 10 agri-environment schemes
developed under Regulation 2078/1992 (reforestation, bird
sanctuary areas, water saving strategies, etc.). All of these
schemes ran alongside actions for protecting wetlands (on
RAMSAR sites) for the Natura 2000 network, for Natural
Parks, and so forth.
This befuddling and complex series of overlapping
schemes, each with its own pattern of preferences, sched-
ules, exclusions and regulatory bodies, adds to the
technical difficulties of implementing a sensible strategy
within the poligonos. The implementation of all these
different actions on parcels within specific poligonos may
effectively drive out sheep grazing altogether. Too many
schemes operating within a system puts a burden on
farmers and agriculture staff. They produce confusing
strategies, are typically accompanied by an additional
burden of paperwork, and the effects of single schemes are
difficult to assess because of the complex interactions
between them.
The cultivators-pastoralists divide in the last 50 years
The implementation of cereal and sheep mixed farming
systems in CLM has been affected by changes in the
Spanish business and social environments. In the 1950s and
1960s, landowner pastoralists dominated most municipal-
ities but most still owned small flocks intended mainly for
family consumption. Farm machinery as a main replace-
ment for labor in its first phase of implementation, and the
number of tractors regularly utilized in 1960 was some 6%
of their actual number. Most landowners used draft animals
for cultivation and had an incentive to rotate cereal and
legumes for animal and food consumption. The members
of the family shared crop and sheep workloads full time.
In 1970, in 65% of the municipalities, landowner pas-
toralists and landless pastoralists were both present,
although the second group dominated. The level of
machinery utilization had increased to some 30% of current
use. Cereal and sheep production became more market-
oriented and the mean size of sheep flocks increased to
some 150 breeding ewes. As the mean size of the land did
not allow for the maintenance of such sizeable flocks,
landowners concentrated on production of cereals, and the
number of pastoralists started to decrease. More educated
young farmers looked for job opportunities in alternative
sectors of the economy, rejecting the hard-working con-
ditions of the sheep operation.
In 1997, in 65% of municipalities, only landless pasto-
ralists were present and this group owned 80% of sheep
flocks in the entire region. The mean flock size had
increased to some 230 breeding ewes in 1989 and some
320 breeding ewes in 1997. Farm machinery started to
reach a plateau with full implementation (some 40 ha of
cultivated land per tractor). Cultivation of cereals required
some 10 h/ha 9 year or 300 h/year per an average 30 ha of
cropland. Attending an average-sized sheep flocks of 300
breeding ewes required a year-long labor because the
structure of grazing units and interspersion of pastoral
resources left little profit margin for landless pastoralists to
improve grazing conditions.
Current records from LACOPE (for 2002) still showed a
divide between cultivators and pastoralists. At present,
some 95% of sheep farmers rely on feed resources on the
polı´gonos; but we have found that, progressively, a higher
proportion of them may rent or own land parcels to provide
complementary forage resources. The actual size of the
sheep flock has increased to more than 450 breeding ewes
but the regional sheep flock has not changed much, as the
numbers of sheep farmers declined rate of 3–4% per year in
the last 35 years.
Implementation of the regional law resulted in little
success. A large majority of municipalities (85%) abided
by the law in appointing a corresponding LGC, but only a
minority (18%) had implemented mandatory grazing
management plans, even after 5 years of establishment and
enforcement of the law (Table 1).
Currently, the cereal-sheep system can be considered to
be a modified form of a past traditional system dating from
before the introduction of farm machinery in the early
sixties. The cereal subsystem evolved in response to new
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technologies (such as crop varieties, chemical fertilizers,
and farm machinery) as a requirement for higher produc-
tivity, cutting costs and resulting in less labor–demanding
operations. The sheep subsystem has changed less, reacting
to productivity demands by increasing the size of the sheep
flocks and responding to labor demands by lessening
grazing-days and increasing indoor feeding.
The introduction of farm subsidies since the Spanish
entry into the EU in 1986 exacerbated the divisiveness
between cultivators and pastoralists, as they are now enti-
tled to separate schemes of payments that do not take into
account joint use of the land. However, changes observed
in the system are probably more the consequence of rising
incomes and structural changes in the Spanish business
environment than of the vagaries of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP). The successive reforms of the CAP
(1992, Agenda 2000) did not bring any apparent change
over the general trends of the system that we have sum-
marized, and others drivers of change should also be
considered (Fig. 2).
Under the last Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the CAP
(summer 2003), subsidies have been partially or totally
de-coupled from production under some land use rules—
yet to be implemented. Facing the prospect of abandon-
ment of marginally-cultivated lands and land use rules
linked to extensive grazing strategies, mixed cereal and
sheep systems may improve operational facilities. This
scenario is considered as part of the extensification scheme,
but may be altered if increases in world prices of cereal
grain continue. Only some modeling scenarios within
LACOPE have been devised to estimate the possible
effects (Fernandes and Guiomar 2006). The best we can
say is that policy-makers should be aware of how the
system is presently functioning to establish land use rules
that successfully favor cereal-sheep integration under
revamped legal and institutional frameworks adapted to
new economic conditions and trade globalization. This task
is worthwhile because the traditional strategies of planting
annual legumes and mixing cereal and sheep still make
environmental sense (Table 2).
Access to grazing rights
The divergent views between cultivators and pastoralists
were again revealed when the question was posed of
whether grazing resources should be considered to be
mainly a private or public good. The first alternative (pri-
vate) would imply that access to grazing resources should
be linked to land property ownership while the second
(public) would consider grazing resources to be within the
public domain. The present legal framework upheld past
regulations on this essential provision.
The legal framework discriminates between small and
large-sized land holders regarding the transference of
grazing rights. The former group does not have the
opportunity to link grazing right to land property (grazing
rights in the public domain) as does the latter group. The
current regional grazing regulation assumes that large
landowners may more readily maintain sizeable flocks, but
this social group is largely uninterested in the sheep
operation (some 10% of flocks only in poligonos segre-
gados and 90% using poligonos parcelarios). Under the
current regime, large areas of grazing land are underused
and regional stocking of sheep is concentrated in the rented
land, where stocking in some six times higher than in non-
rented land (Caballero 2002a).
Access to grazing rights can be achieved through three
main channels. The first, and most usual, is a direct grant
by the LGC in charge of the renting land (poligonos
Table 1 Implementation of the regional grazing law (ley 7/2000) in
Castile-La Manchaa
Province No. of
municipalities
No. of
municipalities
with LGCsb
No. of
municipalities
with GMPsc
Albacete 87 74 23
Ciudad Real 98 71 23
Cuenca 234 226 13
Guadalajara 289 285 53
Toledo 204 122 50
Total 912 778 162
a Data in December 2005 after 5 years of the law in force
b LGC: Local Grazing Commission
c GMP: Grazing Management Plans (Ordenanzas locales de Pastos)
Improvement 
of the Spanish 
business environment
Divergence of 
EU subsidies 
Mechanization
of agriculture
Increasing economic
opportunities for 
young farmers 
Progressive divide 
between cereal and 
sheep farmers 
Cereal and sheep 
In familiar 
agriculture
Mixed cereal 
and sheep 
systems 
Possible convergence 
of EU subsidies 
under de-coupling 
Mid-term EU 
revamping of the CAP 
1960-1990
2003-2006
1980-20001950-1960
Fig. 2 The cultivators-pastoralists divide over the last 50 years in
Castile-La Mancha
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parcelarios). The second is constituted by special agree-
ment between large landowners (who do not maintain their
own flocks) and one landless pastoralist (poligonos segre-
gados). Frequently and third, under low pressure for access
to grazing rights, pastoral resources are distributed by
informal consensus or decision making among interested
pastoralists. As the number of pastoralists is declining,
some municipalities may possess non-allocated poligonos.
These are granted to outside petitioners, usually from
neighboring municipalities, and remainder is unused. A
non-competition principle is operating between cultivators
(supply side) in the sense that grazing fees are fixed within
a limited range of prices by the PGC, so there is no dif-
ference in grazing fees between poligonos within
municipalities and very little between poligonos of neigh-
boring municipalities.
The way the pastoral resources are managed resembles
the problem associated with a ‘‘public good’’ in the sense
that non-exclusion and non-competition principles are par-
tially operating on the supply side. For small crop farmers,
membership is compulsory and they must abide by the law in
providing the grazing resources. This is in line with the idea
of Olson (1971) on inclusive collective goods. On the
demand side, however, landless pastoralists of particular
municipalities have access-preference to the grazing poli-
gonos over those of neighboring municipalities or outside
petitioners, and most poligonos are linked to use by partic-
ular pastoralist over the years, to the exclusion of outsiders.
The use of a particular poligono is usually transferred only
when the flock is sold to a new operator (usually another
landless pastoralist of the municipality or of a neighboring
municipality). Pastoralists are thus operating with the
exclusion principle under a ‘‘club good’’ situation.
Following the ideas of Olson (1971), a revamping of the
system based on the majority principle would be difficult to
apply in the bargaining of grazing rights, because of the
unbalanced size of the two groups. As the cost of self-
exclusion under current grazing fees would be very low,
even a minority of self-excluded cultivators would hinder
the utilization of the poligonos. It should be taken into
account that law already excludes parcels of olives, vine-
yards, and irrigated crops. Under recent EU Rural
Development Regulations (1257/1999), parcels under agri-
environment schemes (i.e. reforestation) are also excluded
from grazing use.
The legal basis of the cereal-sheep grazing system has
been questioned under the assumption of interference with
property rights, but the consensus agreement has been
operative for centuries (Nieto 1959). Landless pastoralists
have customary use-rights (derecho consuetudinario) to
pastoral resources, and most cultivators abide by the law
under a sense of social responsibility, but neither see
themselves as real stakeholders in the management of the
system nor as receivers of comparative benefits. Most
cultivators do not restrain the access of flocks to their
grazing land, but they do not expect co-operative behavior
for sensible use of the grazing resources.
Main problems of the present Regional Regulation
on Grazing Management
The legal and institutional framework (Law 7/2000,
December, 5) may fall short of expectations in three mayor
issues: grazing rights, grazing fees and security of tenure.
Grazing rights remain under the public domain, but the
power of cultivators and pastoralists remains unbalanced.
For the former, the sheep operation is only a secondary
option of land use. Benefits and costs are not shared
proportionately as this group only receives a low, fixed
grazing fee. In the LACOPE project, we estimated the
Table 2 Potential environmental benefits of legumes cultivation and mixed cereal with sheep farming systems of the Mediterranean basin
Environmental benefits of legume cultivation Environmental benefits of mixed cereal and sheep farming systems
Cereal yields stabilization and break-up of the cycle of pathogens
when changing from cereal-fallow to cereal-legumes rotation
(Romero 1988; Lacasta 1995; Pala 1997)
Raising cereal yields, soil organic matter, and the soil biota
(Pimentel and Heichel 1991; ICARDA 1998)
N fixation and CO2 sequestration (Papastilianou 1999)
Quality forage for sheep and feeding and nesting habitat for steppe
birds (de Juana et al. 1993; Caballero et al. 1996)
Better water-use efficiency of rainfall in relation to fallowlands
(Lacasta 1995; Roman 1996; Yesilsoy and Ersahin 1997)
Less grazing pressure on pastoral resources as complementary
forage is available for structural non-grazing season (Arnon
1992; Caballero 1993)
Raising land productivity by adding values of production of cereal
and sheep in the same land unit (Caballero 2003; Fernandes and
Guiomar 2006)
Adding value to non-competitive and low-quality pastoral
resources by obtaining high quality animal products
(Caballero et al. 1992; Valiente 2004)
Maintaining biodiversity of natural pastures by breaking
vegetation succession to lower biodiversity of Mediterranean
shrubby vegetation types (Ferrer et al. 2001; Go´mez Sal 2001;
Pineda 2001; SEEP 2001)
Increasing manure availability for improvements of low organic
matter soils (Carlevaris et al. 1992; Bello 1993; Correal and
Sotomayor 1998)
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farming income of cereal cultivation alone versus mixed
cereal and sheep. The total farming income per unit of land
was higher for the second option but the share of the cereal
operation was 25% lower than with the first option (Fer-
nandes and Guiomar 2006). It seems that cereal farmers
should be compensated if co-operative behavior is expec-
ted. Under the current situation, large landowners have an
incentive to maintain the status quo of exclusion and bar-
gain the leasing of their resources with particular
pastoralists. An important environmental implication is the
heterogeneous distribution of regional stocking between
polı´gonos segregados and polı´gonos parcelarios.
Grazing fees are fixed by the PGC within a limited range
for bargaining in the LGC. Under the present legal
framework, competition for access to grazing rights is
almost non-existent. Landless shepherds, paying a low and
fixed grazing fee, are motivated to use leased land but not
to increase grazing days. The Pasture and Stubble Act does
not tie leasing to a minimum use of grazing resources. The
LGC does not have the incentive to offer better grazing
infrastructure or provide extra services or resources to
potential claimants. The differential quality of the polı´go-
nos, even within particular municipalities, in resources or
infrastructures does not translate to prices. As a conse-
quence, leased land farther away from the nucleus of the
village is much less used with heterogeneous stocking at
the municipality scale. Another important trend is the
increase of indoor feeding operations. In the LACOPE
sample, 65% of milk-oriented sheep farmers maintained
the milking lot under indoor feeding conditions, with
implications for the identity of the regional Manchego
cheese. Under these conditions, sheep farmers have
incentives to change to more productive but less grazing-
adapted foreign breeds.
Security of tenure is, according to sheep farmers’
responses, another important issue not properly addressed
in the regional regulation. Grazing infrastructures would
require technical expertise and long term capital. Landless
pastoralists are not motivated to implement grazing infra-
structures without security of tenure in the long run. The
question of who is going to implement and maintain
grazing infrastructures within the polı´gonos is also blurred
and the LGC lacks of financial capabilities to do so. Most
pastoralists do not own any piece of land, but a minority of
them (25% in the LACOPE sample) owned or rented land
within the leased polı´gono. This option greatly facilitates
grazing management and sheep feeding. Under this option,
sheep farmers have the chance to build grazing infra-
structure within the polı´gonos and planting complementary
forages, thus improving the energy efficiency of shep-
herding and reducing dependency on manufactured feeds.
In short, a mixed cereal and sheep operation may deliver
environmental and economic benefits, but the successful
implementation of this strategy requires the willingness of
stakeholders. Present regulatory and market-driven incen-
tives (the recent increase of world prices for cereal grain,
for example) work against implementation of less-intensive
cultivation practices. Some environmental consequences
are a lower contribution of organic matter of poor quality
soils, and lower quality habitat quality for threatened
wildlife species such as the steppe bird, including the great
bustard (Otis tarda).
Discussion of proposals
Previous sections dealt with constraints, mainly the
inability of grazing regulations to provide equilibrium of
interests for the two stakeholders. In this section we discuss
the feasibility of alternative proposals and amendments to
the current laws and policies.
Common-pool resources
Management of pastoral resources faces problems of tem-
poral and spatial distribution of grazing, under-use, and
occasional overstocking. How should EU and regional
regulations deal with these concerns?
Cereal-stubble, the main feed resource in arable-domi-
nant landholdings, is available from early July to last
August depending on the intensity of use and the quality of
the resource (Valiente 2004). The length of the season can
be prolonged, when not plowed, until November on what is
called ricial (re-growth of unharvested cereal grain and
adventitious warm-season species induced by early-autumn
rainfall). Grain legumes and forage legume stubble (after
haymaking) is of higher quality, but of much less acreage
than cereal stubble. They are available, respectively, from
May–June. Sunflower stubble is available in September-
October. The other main resource from arable land is the
utilization of fallowing under the traditional cereal-fallow
rotation (near 1 million ha in CLM). After plowing the
cereal stubble, or after the ricial, the lands rest during the
fallow period until the following October-November
autumn period. Sheep flocks can utilize this resource
mainly during spring, providing that the cereal farmer does
not intensively cultivate during the traditional fallow per-
iod (Caballero 2001a).
Temporal availability of fallow and stubble thus depend
on management operations by farmers, but neither the
regional nor the EU regulations are focussed on this con-
cern. The former only states a minimum post-harvest
period should be maintained before plowing the cereal
stubble, but does not set rules for temporal grazing-rights
interchanges between pastoralists. The current EU regula-
tions (MTR and de-coupling of subsidies) set cultivators
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free of implementing management alternatives under some
environmental rules (cross-compliance).
EU and regional regulations focussing on the objective
of cereal and sheep integration are thus lacking and the
economic rationale for cultivators may stress the already-
present divide. Present trends in intensive cultivation arable
farmers are continuing, projecting a concomitant decrease
in shepherding, favoring indoor feeding into the future. For
the latter group, however, shepherding represents lower
feeding costs, but lower costs can be realized only if pas-
toral resources are available and working conditions
improved.
Regarding the spatial distribution of stocking, this point
can be addressed at three levels. At the regional level,
stocking on poligonos parcelarios can be higher than in
poligonos segregados because many large landowners do
not maintain their own flock. At the municipality level,
stocking can differ between poligonos. Even in some
municipalities, some poligonos can be under-utilized or left
unused (e.g., not rented due to a lacking of claimant pas-
toralists). At the poligono level, stocking may differ
between parcels located near a village (which may expe-
rience occasional overstocking) versus more distant parcels
(typically under-utilized) because pastoralists tend to avoid
long journeys, particularly for milking-oriented flocks.
Also on the issue of spatial grazing management, two
problems should be differentiated: access and mobility.
Access is something regulated by law. Pastoralists do not
have access to parcels of vineyards, olive orchards, and
plots under irrigation; and more recently and on the
increase, to parcels under the jurisdiction of environmental
schemes (i.e., direct sowing, organic agriculture, refores-
tation, environmental sunflower). Frequently, these parcels
are interspersed within the polı´gonos. Mobility is the way
to reach accessible or grazing-allowed plots. This is facil-
itated for a radial distribution of the polı´gonos towards the
nucleus of the village (Fig. 1) and for keeping livestock
traffic to mandatory drove-paths. Frequently, these paths
disappear under intensive tilling. Access and mobility
problems exacerbate each other, and spatial grazing man-
agement is plagued with problems—more than likely the
pastoralists experiencing the worst of it.
Grazing management under the traditional system is
thus a hard-working operation. The pastoralists must con-
sistently monitor the flocks because the poligonos are
unfenced and graze-allowed, and non-allowed parcels are
contiguous and interspersed. Progressively, the pastoral use
of the poligonos is becoming more and more complex as
more parcels fall within the non-grazed status (such as new
vines and olives plantation, reforestation and other EU-
supported environment schemes). A trend towards sheep
operations less linked to grazing resources and more
in-door feeding is apparent. This trend is important during
winter and on milking-oriented flocks (particularly for the
milking lot).
In the LSGS system of Castile-La Mancha, pastoral
resources are a pool of cultivators’ parcels (grouped by the
law), but the main stakeholders regarding the use of these
common-pooled resources are not the cultivators, but the
pastoralists. Theoretically, a group of 40–50 cultivators
(owners of a medium-size poligono parcelario of 400 ha)
may maintain a sizeable flock operated collectively, with
operators sharing costs and benefits. This situation is not
operating well in Castile-La Mancha currently, probably
because the number of actors is too high for collective
action to be effective, and the potential shared return too
low.
Complementary forage resources
Planting annual forage legumes for haymaking, as a trade-
off lack of access to land coming out of fallow, is a
rewarding strategy under current schemes (Fernandes and
Guiomar 2006). Under this alternative, the forage deficit
can be calculated through use of a mass-balance model
taking into account livestock feeding requirements, the
stocking rate, and anticipated hay yields (Caballero 1993).
Stakeholders entering such an agreement or decision have
different interests, but the potential for co-operation exists.
Pastoralists are interested but, frequently, they do not own
land for planting. Cultivators do not own the flocks and
forage legumes are not supported under non-decoupled
schemes of direct payments. The potential co-operation is
not limited to a particular poligono. Cultivators may sell
the hay to different pastoralists or even outside the region.
In fact, there exists a limited but potentially lucrative
market for annual legume hay.
Planting legumes represents an environmental advan-
tage (Table 2) to cultivators (by fixing nitrogen and
enhancing soil organic matter) and to society as a whole
(environmental benefits for the soil biota and for steppe
birds). There are no major technical problems associated
with planting or haymaking of forage legumes (Caballero
et al. 1996).
The identity of regional products
The Manchega sheep breed could be classified as a two-
production objective breed of intermediate productivity.
Pastoralists have other options regarding the sheep breed
such as using other meat-oriented indigenous breeds such
as Talaverana, Ojalada and Seguren˜a or milk-oriented
foreign breed such as Awassi or Lacaune. The latter option
may represent important outcomes for the system. The use
of a milk-oriented foreign breed is greatly related with
more indoor feeding because these breeds are more
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productive, but poorly adapted to take advantage of sea-
sonal and low-quality pasture resources as is the locally-
adapted Manchega breed. Another important outcome of
the indoor feeding and mixed breed flock option is the
identity of regional products. Those pastoralists choosing
to raise foreign breeds cannot be affiliated with the
Regional Council of Manchego Cheese Producers
(RCMCP). The RCMCP provides regulations recognized
by the RG (JCCM 1995) and the EU (EU Directive 1107/
96), affects almost half the milk-oriented sheep farmers in
Castile-La Mancha (some 1300 in 2005), and covers
grazing land of some 500 municipalities. The regulations of
the RCMCP emphasize maintenance of the Manchega
breed, and make standards for milking, storing and cheese-
making operations. For the purpose of our study, however,
it is important to understand that provisions for the pro-
duction system are not included. Manchego cheese, for
both indoor and grazing-based operations, is sealed by the
RCMCP. In this sense, the Council acts as a driving force
in the maintenance of the Manchega breed, but not for
land-based cereal and sheep integration.
Questions regarding sheep breeds and production sys-
tems are thus related. Sheep farmers are prone to change
from the extensive-grazing and harsh-working conditions
associated with the Manchega breed to the indoor-feeding,
foreign-breed system that results in higher productivity and
improved conditions for labor. This trend is consistent with
standard economic theory (Naredo and Carpintero 2004).
But the new pattern has consequences for the identity of
Manchego cheese and may stall the potential environ-
mental benefits of the mixed cereal and sheep grazing
operation (Table 2). This paradox can be solved through
the market or through compensatory payments. If markets
can differentiate the price of the two operations (higher
price for the identity of lamb meat and cheese products
under grazing), sheep farmers may have an incentive to
maintain the grazing operation. If not, the society as a
whole may find that it may need to reward sheep farmers
for maintaining the sheep grazing operation. Whether
markets can differentiate by price is a question, as well as
whether the current scheme of the EU payment may con-
tribute or not to maintain the grazing operations.
Grazing rights and grazing fees
Recent research on comparative typology (Caballero et al.
2007) emphasizes the role of different actors as providers or
users of land resources according to forms of organization.
In purely economic literature the terms ‘‘public good’’
is associated with non-exclusion and non-competition
principles (Olson 1971).
The non-exclusion principle does apply theoretically to
cultivators because they cannot refuse to award grazing
right to pastoralists. Most of them abide by the law, but
infringements can take many forms (i.e. plowing the
stubbles before the pastoralists can use them) and imped-
iments is the norm. The non-competition principle can be
applied to the system as cultivators provide the pastoral
resources at the same price and price or extra services
cannot differentiate the offered resources. A public good
situation in the supply side is found, although the willing
co-operation of cultivators is a crucial ingredient (e.g.,
concerted action in common-pooled resources).
The non-exclusion principle does not apply to pasto-
ralists within municipalities. Even pastoralists within a
municipality may distribute resources by inner consensus
with exclusion of outside claimants (Fig. 1). Pastoralists
are operating on a ‘‘club or toll good’’ situation on the
demand side. Exclusion of other potential claimants,
however, does not apply to those municipalities where the
existence of non-granted (free poligonos) is becoming
more and more usual.
Infringements can be settled before the LGCs, but the
uncooperative performance of a few cultivators within a
poligono may hinder severely the overall development. For
now, the best the LGCs can do is to issue a warning and try
to cajole cultivators and pastoralists into cooperating and
following the rules. Infringement proceedings are rare
because most infractions are considered to be minor, but
the law had established proceeding and sanctions for
uncooperative actors (most of the time cultivators, but also
pastoralists) to be taken to the PGCs or to ordinary courts
in the case of major infractions. Most common infractions
by cultivators consist of hindering access by pastoralist to
approved use parcels, plowing stubble before the allowed
date, or setting barriers to easy transit of flocks. Most
common infractions by pastoralists are the introduction of
flocks in segregated land, grazing a higher than allowed
stocking rates, or grazing non-allowed lands. In short, the
LSGS in CLM is essentially non-cooperative, but actors are
forced by law to co-operate.
Because there are few incentives, shared values, and or
trust, among the social actors of the system, the institu-
tional and legal frameworks themselves not been devised
by collective action or co-operation (Ostrom et al. 1994)
but by government intervention (Olson 2000). Normative
actions, however, may provide better results if consensus
between actors had been reached on the way to amending
the system (Caballero and Gil 2008).
The behaviorist paradigm (Kahneman and Tversky
2000) stresses the distinction between normative versus
positive behavior (i.e., how people should make decisions
versus how they actually do so). While the law (normative)
presumes co-operation, cultivators have little incentive for
co-operation. They may be acting under a rational decision-
making paradigm (neoclassical economic theory) of
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attending closely to opportunity costs incurred by co-
operation (i.e., the cost of losing agri-environment subsidies
or the income losses under low-tillage practices). The main
failure of the behaviorist paradigm is that it assigns to the
normative and cohesion paradigms a big role in actual
decision making. What this study shows is that either nor-
mative (pasture law) or cohesion between stakeholders is
important issues, but people are more driven by rational
choices or positive behavior caused by a changing business
environment.
The same applied to normative EU regulations. The
continuous and declining trend of the shepherding opera-
tion in CLM is unrelated to the vagaries of the CAP since
the Spanish entry in the EU. Comparative research with
others EU extensive systems (Kleijn et al. 2006; Caballero
et al. 2007) stresses the mixed results of EU regulations.
Because there is a wide variety of LSGSs across Europe
(Holz 2005), policy makers may not wait for each and
every one of these systems to be analyzed and evaluated
before devising policy schemes. In this sense, a short-cut
route may deliver a never-ending process of CAP policy
reforms.
In CLM, the question of property jurisdiction is targeted
to individual user-rights, not collective user-rights. The
current law distinguishes between property rights (to the
cultivators) and user-rights (to the pastoralists) on the basis
of customary use-rights (derecho consuetutinario in Span-
ish) that have been operative for centuries. Any institution
determines property type. However, property type deter-
mines the institutional management of the pastoral
resources because large landowners (polı´gonos segregados)
are segregated from the renting regime regulated by the
institutions. The current normative framework is failing to
promote co-operation between stakeholders because both
groups are driven by divergent external incentives.
Because they are not able to set their own fees, thus
differentiate themselves from each other, the LGCs do not
have the incentive to offer better grazing infrastructure or
provide extra services or resources for potential claimants.
Even within a particular municipality, the variation of
type and distribution of resources between the poligonos
can be high and it seems senseless to set a fixed grazing
fee for all. Amending the system of setting grazing fees
can be controversial, and the LGCs lack managerial and
technical support to provide a more open system. If
this would be the case, a system to grant grazing rights
to claimants under a sealed document of conditions
(environmental conditions included) may represent an
alternative. The regulation does not set a different price
cap according to the quality of the resources on offer of
specific poligonos and assess the reaction of claim pas-
toralists. A more market-oriented approach would be to
set grazing fees by an open auction of pastoral resources.
This latter option is included in the law as an alternative
to direct internal grants and fixed grazing fees; but in
practice very few, if any, pastoralist are awarded grazing
rights by this scheme.
In conclusion, formal institutions and laws regulating
pastoral land-use are affected by the larger political and
economic setting in which they exist. The cereal-sheep
system of CLM is a system in transition from subsistence
pastoralism to market-oriented livestock production. The
management goal is changing from subsistence to profit
maximization. Management strategies, policy reforms and
formal institutions should take into account the general
Spanish business environment and the convergence of
interests of main stakeholders (cultivators and pastoralists).
In particular, trends towards intensified agricultural pro-
duction, driven by the EU scheme of subsidies and the
recent scaling of cereal prices may have a devastating
impact on the viability of pastoral institutions and the
management practices they support.
Recommendations
This research provides an overview of the social dynamics
in the LSGS in Castile-La Mancha, and an unveiling the
main limiting factors and their nature (whether these fac-
tors are social, structural or technical). It depicts the
evolution of the system over time and how changing
business environments have altered the relative bargaining
force of the main stakeholders. In the future, it would be
worth testing the reaction of farmers to the more recent EU
regulations (MTR and de-coupling). In the present cir-
cumstances, a list of limiting factors and recommendations
can be drafted that would require a consensus by main
actors for implementation.
The mixed cereal-sheep farming system is at present
uncompetitive and structurally unfeasible for cultivators as
they face other alternatives for crops and agri-environment
subsidized schemes. However, the sheep operation adds
value to seasonal and low-quality pastoral resources. If a
mixed cereal-sheep farming operation is looked for, culti-
vators should be lured with specific incentives. This can be
addressed by devising an area-specific payment scheme
that takes into account the interests of the two key social
groups.
Grazing infrastructure should be enhanced to improve
spatial and temporal distribution of grazing and to improve
inconvenient, harsh working conditions endured by some
pastoralists. Particularly, grazing plans should provide
incentives for moving the sheepfolds within the awarded
polı´gonos. Young Castilian farmers are uninterested in the
sheep operation because of the current harsh working
conditions, and family farm succession is not assured.
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The labor factor is probably one of the most limiting
present circumstances. One recommendation would be to
implement ‘‘shepherd schools’’ with the aims of raising
professionalism, increasing the social status of the shep-
herd’s job, and improving the overall capacity of migrant
workers.
The forage deficit during wintertime is a structural factor
that can be addressed. Alternatives to meet the forage
deficit (i.e. introducing annual legumes into the crop rota-
tion) should be posed and factors detracting farmers from
implementing unveiled.
Legal and institutional factors may hinder the sustain-
ability of the LSGS in Castile-La Mancha. The interests of
cultivators, access to grazing rights, and empowerment of
the LGCs with technical and managerial support are
probably the most concerning factors.
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